SMITH, District Judge.
This opinion addresses eight motions in limine filed by plaintiff, Abbott Point of Care, Inc., an entity that plaintiff's counsel refer to by the acronym "APOC" for reasons that are discussed in Part IV, infra, but one which this court prefers to reference by the simple, descriptive term "Abbott." Abbott's motions are listed here in the order in which they were filed, but not the arrangement in which they are discussed below: i.e., (1) motion to bar defendant, Epocal, Inc. ("Epocal"), from making pleas to the jury's pecuniary interests;
Epocal has conceded Abbott's motion to exclude evidence and argument relating to invalidity (# 2 above), and its motion to preclude Epocal from offering any evidence or argument regarding Abbott's request for injunctive relief (# 7 above).
This case presents both legal and equitable issues. Abbott's claims for patent infringement and tortious interference with contractual relations are legal claims that must be decided by a jury. Epocal's defenses of estoppel and unclean hands, on the other hand, are equitable in nature, and must ultimately be decided by this court. The dual nature of the claims presented has raised complex questions as to the order in which the issues should be tried.
The court presented the parties three options at the pre-trial conference. The first was to conduct separate trials, with evidence on all legal issues being presented to a jury during the first trial, and evidence on all equitable matters presented to the court, outside the hearing of the jury, during the second. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b) ("For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims. When ordering a separate trial, the court must preserve any federal right to a jury trial."). The second option was to conduct parallel trials, divided between morning and afternoon sessions, with legal issues tried before a jury during the morning, and equitable issues tried to the court during the afternoon. The third option was to simultaneously try legal and equitable issues before the same jury, and to require the jurors to return advisory verdicts on the factual matters related to the equitable claims, with the final decision on the equitable issues being reserved to the court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(c) ("In an action not triable of right by a jury, the court, on motion or on its own: (1) may try any issue with an advisory jury; or (2) may, with the parties' consent, try any issue by a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if a jury trial had been a matter of right, unless the action is against the United States and a federal statute provides for an nonjury trial.").
Abbott's motion in limine promotes an approach that falls somewhere between the court's first and second options:
Abbott is opposed to having evidence relating to Epocal's defenses of unclean hands and equitable estoppel presented to the jury, even in an advisory capacity, because it believes such evidence will unduly prejudice the jury against Abbott and will divert attention from Epocal's own, allegedly-infringing conduct.
Id. The district court rejected the defendant's arguments in favor of the plaintiff's argument that allowing the jury to hear evidence on the defendant's equitable defenses would be unfairly prejudicial and confusing to the jury. According to the court, "admission of such evidence or reference to such [equitable] defenses might invite the jury to make a determination on the basis of `equitable' considerations that do not properly enter into any determination that the jury must make." Id. at 149-50. Therefore, the court held that the equitable defenses of defendant Ottawa Plant Food would be tried in a non-jury proceeding separate from Pioneer's infringement claim. Id. at 150.
Similarly, in THK America v. NSK, Ltd., No. 90 C 6049, 1996 WL 33398071 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 9, 1996), the court noted that evidence relating to the defendant's affirmative defense of inequitable conduct was, in essence, evidence of fraud. Id. at *1. The trial judge concluded that a high risk of prejudice and confusion of the issues would result if that evidence was presented
On the other hand, there also is authority to support Epocal's contrary position. Epocal asserts that
It is true that, when there are factual questions common to both legal and equitable claims, those facts must be tried to the jury in order to preserve the constitutional right to a trial by jury. See Cabinet Vision v. Cabnetware, 129 F.3d 595, 600 (Fed.Cir.1997) (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 503, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959) (in turn quoting Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109-10, 11 S.Ct. 712, 35 L.Ed. 358 (1891))).
Moreover, the court agrees with Epocal that there is substantial overlap between the evidence to be presented on Abbott's claim for willfulness and the evidence to be presented on Epocal's affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel and unclean hands. To establish willfulness, Abbott
In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2007) (first bracketed alteration supplied, second bracketed alteration in original).
To succeed on its affirmative defense of unclean hands, Epocal must demonstrate that "the doors of a court of equity" should be closed to Abbott because it is "tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which [it] seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of [Epocal]." Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery, 324 U.S. 806, 814-15, 65 S.Ct. 993, 89 L.Ed. 1381 (1945) (bracketed alterations supplied).
To succeed on its affirmative defense of equitable estoppel, Epocal must establish the following three elements.
ABB Robotics, Inc. v. GMFanuc Robotics Corp., 52 F.3d 1062, 1063-64 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (emphasis supplied) (citing A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Fed.Cir.1992)).
Epocal states that it intends to prove its defense of equitable estoppel by demonstrating that Abbott
Epocal also states that it
In light of these overlapping factual issues, the court concludes that Epocal's affirmative defenses should not be tried separately from Abbott's infringement claims, especially Abbott's assertion that Epocal's infringement was willful. See Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. 1:92 CV 877, 1993 WL 761974, at *4 (W.D.Mich. July 20, 1993) (noting that "the issues of laches, estoppel, and willfulness are intertwined with common factual determinations"). The court recognizes the potential for Abbott to suffer some prejudice as a result of the jury hearing evidence of its own misconduct; nevertheless, the court concludes that the risk of prejudice is outweighed by Epocal's interest in preserving its right to a jury trial on its defenses to Abbott's claim of willfulness, as well as by considerations of judicial efficiency. Due to the substantial overlap in underlying facts, it will be extremely difficult to determine precisely what testimony should be presented to the jury, and what testimony should only be heard by the court. Attempting to make that determination likely will require frequent objections, numerous sidebar conferences, and other discussions outside the hearing of the jury. Such continual interruptions of proceedings not only will unnecessarily prolong the trial, but it also will distract
Other district courts have reached the same decision under similar circumstances. In Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro S.A., No. 4:02-cv-40327, 2004 WL 5508752 (S.D.Iowa Sept. 9, 2004), the court held, over the plaintiff's objection of unfair prejudice, that the affirmative defense of inequitable conduct should be presented to the jury for an advisory verdict. Id. at *3-4. The court found that
Id. at *4. See also Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 01-CV-1974, 2006 WL 2739678, at *6-7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2006) (choosing to submit equitable defenses to an advisory jury rather than bifurcating the trial based on considerations of conservation of judicial resources and convenience of witnesses); Medtronic Xomed, Inc. v. Gyrus ENT, LLC, 440 F.Supp.2d 1333, 1336 (M.D.Fla.2006) (finding, when there was substantial factual overlap between legal defense of patent invalidity and equitable defense of inequitable conduct, that holding a separate bench trial on the equitable issues after the jury had heard the remainder of the evidence "would not be the most efficient use of judicial resources, and could require re-calling witnesses who will or had testified at the jury trial").
In conclusion, the court will exercise its discretion to deny Abbott's motion to preclude Epocal from presenting its equitable defenses of unclean hands and equitable estoppel to the jury. See, e.g., Cedarapids, Inc. v. CMI Corp., No. C98-0110 MJM, 1999 WL 33656876, at *1 (N.D.Iowa Oct. 26, 1999) ("Whether or not to bifurcate a trial is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.") (citing O'Dell v. Hercules, Inc., 904 F.2d 1194, 1200 (8th Cir.1990)) (other citations omitted). The same jury empaneled to decide Abbott's infringement claims (and Epocal's legal defenses thereto) also will render an advisory decision on Epocal's equitable defenses of equitable estoppel and unclean hands. The parties will be required to submit proposed interrogatories and verdict forms for the equitable issues in accordance with the instructions at the end of this opinion.
Abbott also asks the court to exclude all evidence of its alleged litigation misconduct, which Epocal proposes to offer in support of its affirmative defense of unclean hands.
Abbott asserts that any such evidence should be barred for the following reasons:
The pertinent parts of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 read as follows:
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b). If a party or attorney violates any of these rules, the court may
Abbott asserts that Rule 11 is an exclusive remedy, in this sense: if a party fails to file a motion for Rule 11 sanctions during the course of litigation, that party is precluded from relying upon any of the facts that might have supported such a motion in pursuing any other course of relief (like an unclean hands defense). Abbott cites two district court decisions in support of its theory. First, in X-It Products, LLC v. Walter Kidde Portable Equipment, Inc., 155 F.Supp.2d 577 (E.D.Va.2001), the defendant argued that the plaintiff had unclean hands due to material misrepresentations it made during the course of pre-litigation business negotiations between the two companies, as well as unspecified other misconduct during the litigation. Id. at 600. The court held:
Id. at 601. With respect to Kidde's allegation that X-IT engaged in pre-litigation misconduct that should bar its recovery of equitable relief, the court held that there were disputed issues of material fact with regard to whether X-IT had made material misrepresentations to Kidde prior to the commencement of the lawsuit. Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment on the remaining aspects of the equitable defense of unclean hands and allowed the claim to proceed to an evidentiary hearing. Id.
The X-IT court did not mention Rule 11, much less hold that Rule 11 was an exclusive remedy when an opponent has engaged in misconduct like that alleged by Epocal here. Further, the "litigation misconduct" in X-IT consisted of "discovery failures and frauds," which is nothing like the inequitable behavior alleged by Epocal here, i.e., filing suit for an improper purpose. Moreover, the X-IT court actually denied summary judgment with regard to the defendant's allegations of the plaintiff's pre-suit misconduct, which are much more like the allegations advanced by Epocal in this case. Therefore, the X-IT case does not lend support to Abbott's argument.
Abbott also cites Mag Instrument, Inc. v. JS Products, Inc., 595 F.Supp.2d 1102 (C.D.Cal.2008), in support of its motion. In that case, the defendant asserted an affirmative defense of unclean hands based upon the plaintiff's attachment of two inaccurate pictures of the defendant's product to its complaint. Id. at 1110. Importantly, the court actually denied the plaintiff's motion to strike the affirmative defense of unclean hands, in which plaintiff had asserted that the defendant's allegations "`fail to provide a legally recognized basis for an unclean hands defense.'" Id. The court went on to grant the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to the unclean hands defense, holding that the defendant had not presented sufficiently "clear evidence of wrongdoing by the plaintiff during the course of the
In summary, Abbott has presented no persuasive authority to support its theory that the failure to file a Rule 11 motion for sanctions based on litigation misconduct bars the later assertion of the affirmative defense of unclean hands based on the same misconduct.
Abbott also asserts that neither its decision not to conduct scientific testing on Epocal's product prior to filing suit, nor its decision to supplement its infringement contentions through the course of the litigation can, as a matter of law, form the basis of Epocal's affirmative defense of unclean hands.
Abbott asserts that the fact that it, "in consultation with its counsel, made a determination not to run independent scientific tests on Epocal's products prior to filing suit cannot support Epocal's unclean hands defense and so should be barred."
Abbott served Epocal with Preliminary Infringement Contentions on June 17, 2008.
An important component of Epocal's argument is the fact that Abbott did not identify the conduit walls of Epocal's card as an alleged "gas equilibration reservoir" in its preliminary disclosures serve on June 17, 2008.
Abbott submitted its Final Infringement Contentions on July 30, 2010, after conducting discovery and receiving the court's claim construction rulings. In its final disclosures, Abbott identified the alleged "gas equilibration reservoir" in Epocal's device as the "plastic material abutting the conduit"; in other words, the conduit walls.
Epocal asserts that Abbott's Final Infringement Contentions are evidence that it didn't just supplement its infringement theory, but, instead, that Abbott "changed the theory completely."
The court agrees that the mere fact that Abbott supplemented its infringement contentions does not necessarily mean that it lacked a good faith basis for asserting its original contentions. Even so, the supplemental contentions still could be relevant to Epocal's unclean hands defense. As discussed in Part I, supra, this court will make the final decision on Epocal's equitable defenses, including the defense of unclean hands. The court can determine the appropriate weight to give to any evidence regarding Abbott's decision to alter its infringement theories during the course of the litigation. There is no reason to completely exclude that evidence.
This court entered an order on February 9, 2012, denying Epocal's motion for summary judgment on all of Abbott's infringement claims, because there were "genuine issues of material fact precluding the entry of judgment as a matter of law in defendant's favor."
Even so, the Rule 11 inquiry is not identical to the unclean hands inquiry. Thus, while the court agrees that its denial of Epocal's motion for summary judgment is a relevant consideration in the analysis of Epocal's defense of unclean hands based on Abbott's alleged failure to conduct a proper pre-filing investigation, it does not necessarily mean that the defense is preordained to failure. Indeed, the court also denied Abbott's motion for summary judgment on the unclean hands affirmative defense, stating that there was sufficient evidence of Abbott's unclean hands to warrant submitting the defense to the jury.
In summary, the court concludes that the denial of Epocal's motion for summary judgment does not warrant exclusion of any evidence regarding its unclean hands defense.
Abbott also asserts that it should not be forced to divulge privileged communications in order to explain its litigation conduct. It points to Epocal's claims that it only decided not to conduct pre-litigation testing of the Epocal device after it consulted with counsel. According to Abbott, "[t]his argument, and others like it, are improper and should not be allowed, for they call directly into question the consultations Abbott had with its lawyers prior to filing suit."
Abbott once again cites only cases arising in the Rule 11 context. To the extent those cases also apply in the context of an unclean hands defense, the most important lessons to be learned from the cases also can be gleaned from an examination of the Advisory Committee's notes on the 1983 revisions to Rule 11:
Ten years later, during the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, the Committee noted that motions based upon Rule 11 should not be prepared in order to "seek disclosure of matters otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine."
The first case cited by Abbott actually is instructive of a balanced approach. In Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc., 732 F.Supp.2d 653 (N.D.Tex.2010), the court considered a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 based on the defendant's alleged failure to conduct an adequate investigation before filing a counterclaim. Id. at 654-55. The court did state, in passing, that a party "is not required to disclose privileged information in defense of its pre-filing efforts." Id. at 660. But that was not the end of the discussion, and the result was not that the court excluded all evidence regarding the alleged failure to conduct an adequate pre-filing investigation. Instead, the court went on to note that, "privilege issues notwithstanding," all parties "must comply with the law." Id. When faced with the accusation that it had failed to conduct an adequate pre-filing investigation, the defendant/counter-claim plaintiff "was not entitled to at once rely on the opinion of counsel to justify its filing of counterclaims but withhold the details of counsel's pre-filing efforts — the sort of details that would allow the Court to verify the adequacy of counsel's efforts — based on privilege." Id.
Similarly, here, Abbott is free to decide how it wants to defend against Epocal's unclean hands allegations. If it chooses to rely upon an "advice of counsel" defense to the allegations of unclean hands, that would "open the door" for Epocal to question it about otherwise protected communications. If Abbott prefers for attorney communications to remain protected by the privilege, it should rely upon some other defense. See In re EchoStar Communications Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed.Cir.2006) ("[W]hen EchoStar chose to rely on the advice of in-house counsel, it waived the attorney-client privilege with regard to any attorney-client communications relating to the same subject matter."). In any event, the possibility that responding to Epocal's allegations of unclean hands may require Abbott to disclose some otherwise protected information should not prevent Epocal from asserting the defense altogether. Epocal will be permitted to present evidence to support its claim that Abbott had unclean hands when filing this lawsuit, including evidence regarding Abbott's pre-suit investigations. Even so, Abbott will not be required to disclose any information protected by the attorney-client privilege, unless there has been a waiver of the privilege. The best way to determine whether evidence should be allowed is to await the context in which it is presented at trial.
Finally, Abbott asserts that the probative value of evidence of its alleged litigation misconduct is outweighed by the potential for prejudice and confusion of the jury. See Fed.R.Evid. 403.
In conclusion, Abbott's motion to exclude all evidence and argument of its alleged litigation misconduct is due to be denied.
Abbott next asks the court to prevent Epocal from appealing to the jurors' "pecuniary interests" by arguing that Epocal is the manufacturer of lower-cost medical equipment, or that Epocal's product is a lower-cost alternative to Abbott's device. Abbott asserts, in a general manner, that any such evidence would be irrelevant, prejudicial, and confusing to the jury.
In response, Epocal offers the explanation that "it does not intend to appeal to the jury's pecuniary interest" by arguing that the jurors' medical costs will increase if the jury returns a verdict finding that Epocal infringes Abbott's patents.
Even so, Epocal does oppose Abbott's motion "to the extent that it would prevent Epocal from presenting evidence that Epocal set out to and did design a less expensive product."
The court is persuaded by Epocal's argument. Abbott's motion will be granted in part and denied in part. Epocal will not be permitted to appeal to the jury's pecuniary interests by directly arguing, or even suggesting, that the jurors' medical costs will increase if they find infringement. That does not mean, however, that Epocal will not be permitted to present any evidence about the relative cost of its products, if that evidence is relevant to another issue in the case.
Abbott "anticipates that Epocal may seek to use information about APOC's size and assets — or those of its parent, Abbott Laboratories — to bias the jury against APOC by portraying this case as a `David v. Goliath' struggle," and asserts that this allegedly "irrelevant and misleading information will have no purpose other than to ignite the jury's emotions and create an improper bias in the minds of the jurors."
The court agrees with Abbott that the relative sizes and assets of the two parties is not relevant to the primary issue at the heart of Abbott's claims — i.e., whether Epocal infringed Abbott's patents. Even so, as Epocal points out, such evidence may be relevant to its affirmative defenses of unclean hands and equitable estoppel, as well as to its defenses to Abbott's claim for tortious interference with contractual relationships. As part of its unclean hands defense, Epocal asserts that Abbott brought this lawsuit for improper reasons, such as draining Epocal's limited resources and preventing it from competing with Abbott in the marketplace. As part of its equitable estoppel defense, Epocal will assert that both Abbott and its parent, Abbott Laboratories, were involved in negotiations to acquire Epocal. The relative corporate sizes of the parties will be necessary background information to support those theories. In defense of Abbott's tortious interference claim, Epocal will argue that some of the Abbott employees who left to work for Epocal did so
Abbott alternatively argues that, even if evidence of the relative sizes and assets of Abbott Laboratories, Abbott Point of Care, Inc., and Epocal is relevant to some issue in the case, the evidence still should be excluded because it would be misleading or unduly prejudicial. Abbott asserts that "such evidence creates a dangerous risk of unfair prejudice among the jury, who may be motivated to sympathize with Epocal because of Abbott's and Abbott Laboratories' position and strength in the marketplace."
Abbott also asserts that mentioning the name of its parent company, Abbott Laboratories, would mislead the jury because of the name similarity between Abbott Laboratories, which is a large, wealthy company, and the entity known as "Abbott Point of Care, Inc.," which is smaller and possesses more limited resources. While the court recognizes some minimal risk of confusion, that risk does not warrant excluding all mention of the parent company, especially considering that the existence of the parent company is relevant to Epocal's affirmative defenses and its defenses to Abbott's affirmative claims of tortious interference, as discussed more fully above. Of course, counsel for Abbott is free to take steps to distinguish the entity they directly represent from its parent company in the minds of the jury. Quite obviously, plaintiff's counsel already have taken one such step, by referring to the plaintiff in all pre-trial submissions by the acronym "APOC," rather than the descriptive term employed by this court and Epocal, "Abbott."
Finally, Abbott asserts that allowing Epocal to introduce evidence of its relatively small size would be misleading, because Epocal may not be as small as it would like the jury to believe. According to Abbott, "Epocal has partnered with a large and established pharmaceutical company, Alere Inc., to handle marketing and distribution of its infringing EPOC System."
In summary, Abbott's motion will be granted in part and denied in part. The parties will be allowed to present evidence regarding the relative sizes and assets of Abbott and Epocal, as well as the existence of Abbott's parent company, Abbott Laboratories, insofar as that evidence is relevant to one of Epocal's defenses, or to any other issue in the case. Even so, the
Abbott asserts that Epocal should not be permitted to introduce evidence that it holds its own patents to cover all or part of the accused device.
Abbott correctly points out that "a defendant cannot use its own patent as a defense to patent infringement."
It is possible, nevertheless, that evidence of Epocal's patents may be — but, is not necessarily — relevant to some other issue in the case. One issue to which such evidence is not relevant is Abbott's claim that Epocal "copied" its product. Epocal essentially is arguing that it did not copy the Abbott design, but actually "designed around" it.
First, Epocal asserts that evidence of its patents is relevant to Abbott's claims of willful infringement. Indeed, the
Additionally, the existence of defendant's patents may be relevant to some of Epocal's affirmative defenses, including equitable estoppel and unclean hands. For example, the Epocal patents could be relevant in determining whether Abbott considered Epocal's inventions to be "new," or whether Abbott was familiar with the details of Epocal's developing product, during the purchase negotiations that took place between Abbott and Epocal.
Even if evidence of defendant's patents is relevant to an issue in this case, the question remains whether admission of that evidence would be unfairly prejudicial, confuse the issues, and/or mislead the jury. See Fed.R.Evid. 403 ("The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."). Abbott asserts that, if evidence of Epocal's patents is allowed, then the jurors may be confused about what patents actually are at issue, or they may wrongly conclude that Epocal's ownership of other patents covering the accused products means that Epocal cannot be found to infringe Abbott's patents. In support, Abbott cites the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in Cameco Industries, Inc. v. Louisiana Cane Manufacturing, No. 92-3158, 1995 WL 468234 (E.D.La. July 27, 1995). There, the court found that admitting evidence of a patent obtained by the defendant "would be unfairly prejudicial to the plaintiff, as this evidence is likely to give the jury the false impression that a patent on the accused machine means that it is substantially different from the machine claimed in plaintiff's patent." Id. at *6. Moreover, said the Cameco court, admitting evidence of the defendant's patent "would shift the focus of the trial from the validity and infringement of [plaintiff's] patent to the validity of [defendant's] patent. A detour of this sort would be only distracting and confusing to the jury, while providing little, if any, relevant information." Id.
This court appreciates this potential for jury confusion. Even so, the court concludes that any risk of confusion or other prejudice would be outweighed by the probative value of the evidence to issues like willfulness, or the affirmative defenses of estoppel or unclean hands. That is particularly true considering that the potential for jury confusion could be reduced by use of a limiting instruction.
In summary, the court finds that Epocal should be allowed to produce evidence of the existence of its patents covering the accused device in order to support its defense to Abbott's claim of willfulness, or Epocal's affirmative defenses of equitable
Abbott asserts that the expert reports of Epocal's two expert witnesses, Dr. William Olbricht and Dr. Ranil Wickramasinghe, "are, in large part, devoted to the same subject matter and are therefore cumulative."
As Abbott points out, the first three paragraphs of both expert reports contain the exact same language:
The two experts also reach similar conclusions. Both conclude that the accused Epocal device does not infringe the claims of Abbott's patents because it does not contain a "gas equilibration reservoir,"
The two experts also have similar qualifications.
Finally, the two experts rely on some of the same evidence to form their opinions, including documents describing the polymeric material used in the Epocal device, and drawings and specifications describing the device.
Abbott argues that all of these similarities render Dr. Olbricht's and Dr. Wickramasinghe's reports redundant, and that allowing both experts to testify at trial would unnecessarily prolong the proceedings and result in unfair prejudice to Abbott because it could give the impression that Epocal's case is stronger, simply because Epocal has two expert witnesses, while Abbott only has one. See Royal Bahamian Association, Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., No. 10-21511-CIV, 2010 WL 4225947, at *2 (S.D.Fla. Oct. 21, 2010) (slip copy) ("Unnecessarily similar and cumulative expert testimony may create the risk that a jury will resolve differences in expert opinion by `counting heads' instead of by giving fair consideration to the quality and credibility of each expert's opinions.") (citing Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., Inc., No. 01 C 0736, 01 C 5825, 2004 WL 1899927, at *25 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 23, 2004)).
The district court has broad discretion in controlling the evidence presented at trial, including the decision whether to exclude cumulative evidence. Tran v. Toyota Motor Corp., 420 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir.2005). If the qualifications and proposed testimony of Dr. Wickramasinghe and Dr. Olbricht were exactly identical, as Abbott suggests, the court would not allow both witnesses to testify, because doing so would waste its own time and that of the jury. As Epocal explains, however, there are significant distinctions in the two experts' relative backgrounds, perspectives, and methodologies:
The cases cited by Abbott are not inconsistent with this decision. In Tran, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the trial testimony of a second expert physician who testified about the plaintiff's neck injury (after the treating physician and another expert physician already had testified), because the two experts had similar qualifications, relied upon the same medical evidence, and would testify on the same topics. Tran, 420 F.3d at 1315-16. The court rejected the argument that the second physician would offer a "macro" (or larger, big-picture) perspective on the plaintiff's injury, while the first physician had testified as to the "micro" (or smaller, more isolated) perspective, because a close look at the two experts' proposed testimony revealed that they actually would cover the same topics. Id. Several factors distinguish Tran from the present case. First, as set forth above, Dr. Olbricht and Dr. Wickramasinghe have different credentials, and they offer different perspectives on the infringement issue, even though they ultimately reach the same conclusion. See id. at 1315 (distinguishing a prior case where "the excluded expert's `analysis was somewhat different,' his testimony was `more comprehensive,' and the witness `had different, and arguably better qualifications than the other experts'") (citing Johnson v. United States, 780 F.2d 902, 906 (11th Cir.1986)). Additionally, the court in Tran excluded the second doctor's testimony only after the first doctor already had testified. Tran, 420 F.3d at 1315 ("After Dr. Burton testified, Toyota objected to Dr. Clark's testimony as cumulative.") (emphasis supplied). As such, the court knew exactly what testimony already had been offered, and it could more readily discern whether the second doctor's testimony would be cumulative. Here, in contrast, Abbott is asking the court to speculate in advance of trial and based on the expert reports that the testimony of the two witnesses will be cumulative. Finally, and importantly, even though the Eleventh Circuit in Tran held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the second doctor's testimony, it suggested that it probably would not have made the same decision as the district court if it were faced with similar circumstances. Id. at 1316 ("On this record, we cannot say that the court would have abused its discretion had it allowed Dr. Clark to testify. The testimony likely would not have unduly prolonged the trial, Dr. Clark's practice and experience was somewhat different from that of the other doctors, and Tran might have presented her evidence differently had she known earlier that Dr. Clark would be excluded.").
Abbott also cites Abrams v. Ciba Specialty Chemicals Corp., No. 08-0068-WSB, 2010 WL 779273 (S.D.Ala. March 2, 2010). There, the court raised the concern that a proposed expert's testimony might be cumulative of that offered by another proposed expert for the same party. Id. at *5. The court did not exclude the second expert's testimony, but cautioned that, to the extent the two experts would offer "identical opinions ... based on the same underlying evidence," one of the experts would have to be excluded as cumulative. Id. However, "to the extent that these two experts are relying on differing lines of evidence to reach their conclusions ..., such that their testimony is complementary rather than redundant, it will be allowed." Id. (emphasis supplied). The court therefore directed the party seeking to offer the expert testimony to "coordinate the testimony ... on direct examination
The court is persuaded by the approach taken by the Southern District of Alabama in Abrams. Neither Dr. Olbricht nor Dr. Wickramasinghe will be precluded from testifying due to concerns over presentation of cumulative evidence. Even so, Epocal is directed to plan the testimony of those two experts in order to minimize any overlap or repetition. If the testimony of the second expert called to the stand begins to become cumulative of the testimony of the first of them to testify, the court could take appropriate action to minimize any undue delay in the proceedings.
In accordance with the foregoing, Abbott's motion to exclude evidence and argument related to invalidity,
Abbott's motion to exclude evidence or argument regarding Abbott's alleged litigation misconduct
Abbott's motion to bar Epocal from making pleas to the jury's pecuniary interests,
